Security Zones on IBM System z: Defining and Enforcing Multiple Security Zones

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Note: This is publication is now archived. For reference only.

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Published on 17 February 2011

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IBM Form #: REDP-4652-00


Authors: Alan Altmark

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    Abstract

    Many customers wanting to do Linux® server consolidation and deployment to IBM® System z® experience challenges in balancing the security of a physical “air gap” with the low cost of consolidation on a single box: It goes against their instincts and training. Being able to understand the security implications, capabilities, advantages, and risks of virtual server consolidation helps to lower or remove barriers to growth and the decision to say “Yes” to System z.

    This IBM Redpaper™ publication describes the architecture of traditional network security zones (Internet, DMZ, application, data, and maintenance) that can be securely manifested on System z through the application of best practices for System z hardware management and z/VM® virtual network configuration. This paper also discusses the Law of Unintended Consequences as it applies to shared Open Systems Adapters and HiperSockets™. We also discuss the location of firewalls, enforcement options, and an introduction to labeled security in a z/VM environment.

    You learn how to properly build virtual security zones and integrate virtual servers into your existing security zones. We also discuss using the Resource Access Control Facility (RACF®) Security Server on z/VM to prevent a “red zone” server from connecting to a “green zone” network or “green zone” data.

    Table of Contents

    Introduction

    Preparing the hardware

    A multizone network

    Firewalls

    Virtual switches, VLANs, and traffic separation

    Enforcing the rules with Resource Access Control Facility

    Summary

    Reference information

     

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